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Four-year-olds were more accurate at learning causal structures from their own actions when 
they were allowed to act first and then observe an experimenter act, as opposed to observing 
first and then acting on the environment. Children who discovered the causal efficacy of events 
(as opposed to confirming the efficacy of events that they observed another discover) were 
also more accurate than children who only observed the experimenter act on the environment; 
accuracy in the confirmation and observation conditions was at similar levels. These data 
suggest that while children learn from acting on the environment, not all self-generated action 
produces equivalent causal learning.
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to a variable in a causal environment that affects its value, and thus 
the value of any event directly or indirectly caused by it (see e.g., 
Pearl, 2000), provides the learner with three pieces of information 
that have been validated empirically. First, observing the results of 
actions provides conditional probability data. If a causal relation 
exists between two events X → Y, then the probability that X occurs 
given that Y occurs is not necessarily the same as the probability 
that X occurs given that you make Y occur. Young children can 
recognize such conditional probability information from observ-
ing intervention data (e.g., Gopnik et al., 2001; Schulz and Gopnik, 
2004; Sobel and Kirkham, 2006).
Second, actions offer learners anticipatory information in the 
form of temporal priority: the variable intervened on should be 
considered a cause of any subsequent or concurrent event. Lagnado 
and Sloman (2004, 2006) demonstrated that adults are sensitive to 
this anticipatory information (even over conditional probability 
information). Infants have little trouble anticipating events (e.g., 
Haith, 1993) and such anticipation can indicate their understand-
ing of certain causal relations (e.g., Johnson et al., 2003; Sobel and 
Kirkham, 2006). Further, young children recognize the importance 
of temporal priority in causal inference (e.g., Bullock et al., 1982; 
Sophian and Huber, 1984).
Finally, actions allow a learner to be active in his/her learn-
ing process – one must decide what action to make. Adults and 
elementary-school children learn causal structures more accurately 
from observing the results of their own actions than from observ-
ing another learner generate the same data (Kuhn and Ho, 1980; 
Lagnado and Sloman, 2004; Sobel and Kushnir, 2006). Sobel and 
Kushnir (2006) also found that adults learn better from their own 
actions than from being told what to do – the act of generating those 
actions was, by itself, insufficient to promote accurate learning. 
Preschoolers’ causal reasoning is influenced more by data from their 
own actions over another person’s (Fireman et al., 2003; Kushnir 
and Gopnik, 2005; Kushnir et al., 2009). Even infants, who clearly 
learn from imitation (e.g., Meltzoff, 1988), register the importance 
IntroductIon
Before  the  age  of  five,  children  possess  sophisticated  causal 
knowledge about the physical (e.g., Bullock et al., 1982), psy-
chological (e.g., Wellman, 1990), and biological (e.g., Inagaki and 
Hatano, 1993) domains of knowledge. This enables their predic-
tive (e.g., Shultz, 1982), explanatory (e.g., Schult and Wellman, 
1997), and counterfactual reasoning (e.g., Harris et al., 1996) 
abilities. How do children acquire this knowledge and these 
reasoning abilities?
Both classic theory (e.g., Montessori, 1912/1964; Piaget, 1952) 
and  contemporary  research  (e.g.,  Kushnir  and  Gopnik,  2005; 
Sommerville et al., 2005; Schulz et al., 2007) suggests that chil-
dren treat information generated from their own actions as critical 
for causal learning. Why is this the case? Causal learning requires 
appreciating particular pieces of conditional probability informa-
tion – when two events are correlated, it might be because one 
causes the other or because a third event causes them both (among 
other possibilities). Conditional probability information can be 
used to resolve potential confounds among correlated events that 
might require many observations or observations of events that 
rarely (or never) occur on their own (e.g., Bacon, 1620/1986). To 
use a classic philosophical example, I can observe that the rooster 
crows when the sun rises, but I should not expect the sun to rise at 
2:00 a.m. if I make the rooster crow.
Conditional probability information can be learned from obser-
vation, but actions typically provide conditional probability infor-
mation not present in simply observing the environment. Adults 
learn causal relations better from observing their own actions on a 
system than from observing the same data without knowing what 
actions produced the events (Steyvers et al., 2003; Lagnado and 
Sloman, 2004; Waldmann and Hagmayer, 2005). Four-year-olds 
also show a similar advantage (Schulz et al., 2007).
But why does acting on the environment produce more accu-
rate causal learning than merely observing data? Generating an 
action, or more formally, an intervention – an exogenous change Frontiers in Psychology  |  Developmental Psychology    November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 176  |  2
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ethnicity. All children were fluent English speakers. No formal 
information about SES was collected, but most children appeared 
to be from upper to middle-class families.
Materials
The  lightbox  (shown  in  Figure  1)  was  constructed  from  a 
20 cm × 15 cm × 8 cm black plastic box. Four colored lights (Red, 
Yellow, Blue, and Green) were located in the center of the box, each 
diagonal from an analogous colored button (3 cm in diameter). 
Pressing the button activated its corresponding light. The box was 
wired such that any light could cause any other light to activate, and 
was programmable, such that we could control the causal structure 
among the lights that children observed at any given time. The 
programming worked by flipping a series of switched underneath 
the box that controlled whether each possible causal relation among 
the lights was present or absent.
If  a  causal  link  was  programmed  between  two  lights  (e.g., 
between light A and light B), pressing the button associated with 
A would activate both light A and B while pressing the button 
associated with B would only activate light B. This illumination 
was immediate, so there was no temporal delay between the acti-
vation of light A and B. The lights were illuminated as long as the 
requisite button was pressed. On one side of the box, there was a 
white button and speaker. Pressing this button emitted a cartoon-
like sound effect.
Procedure
The experimenter introduced the lightbox, explained that the lights 
come on when the buttons are pressed, and demonstrated this to the 
child. Initially, no light caused any other light to activate. Children 
were asked to turn on each light to ensure that children knew the 
color names, and would recognize that pressing the corresponding 
button would activate the light of the same color. All children in 
the final analysis answered these questions correctly.
Familiarization  phase.  The  experimenter  then  surreptitiously 
reprogrammed the box such that the red light activated the green 
light, and the yellow light activated blue. Children were shown the 
side button, which was pressed, emitting a cartoonish sound. The 
experimenter said, “Now, the box is different – now, it is a puzzle 
of their own actions when recognizing causal structure from the 
environment (e.g., Sommerville and Woodward, 2005; Sommerville 
et al., 2005).
The present investigation considers a fourth benefit for causal 
learning from action: discovery, which has been traditionally been 
considered important in educational environments. Bruner (1961) 
emphasized that students who discover information for themselves 
are more motivated to achieve educational goals and more likely 
to remember learned information. Various research has suggested 
that students learn better by discovering causal structure through 
guided activity-based exercises, rather than being directly told 
what to do or being given unstructured activity (e.g., Kittel, 1957; 
Shulman and Keisler, 1966; Bredderman, 1983; Mayer, 2004). Our 
goal is to apply this hypothesis to the process of learning a novel 
causal structure.
There are some recent studies in cognitive development have 
emphasized the role of discovery in causal learning. For example, 
Schulz et al. (2007) suggested that children can discover the causal 
efficacy of a novel system through free play. Schulz and Bonawitz 
(2007) demonstrated that preschoolers play more with a toy when 
its causal efficacy is ambiguous than when they are shown uncon-
founded evidence about what the toy does. These data suggest that 
children might learn from discovering the efficacy of the toy on their 
own through their free play, but they do not manipulate whether 
the child actually discovers the causal efficacy first or first observes 
another make that discovery, and then confirm those data. Our 
hypothesis is that actions that discover novel causal information 
as opposed to actions that confirm another’s discovery will lead to 
superior causal learning.
We showed 4-year-olds a novel causal system from which they 
could learn through their own actions. We wanted to contrast how 
children learned causal relations when their actions discovered the 
efficacy of each event in the system with the case in which their 
actions confirmed the results of another’s actions that had previ-
ously demonstrated the efficacy of each event. To do this, one group 
of children were allowed to play freely with the system, and then 
they observed the experimenter play with it, whereas the other 
group was given this procedure in reverse. To ensure that chil-
dren who watched first were not simply distracted by the free play 
procedure, we also examined a third group of children who only 
watched the experimenter act on the causal system. If discovery 
influences causal learning, then one would expect children to be 
more accurate when they discover the causal efficacy of events in 
a system than in either of the other conditions.
ExpErImEnt
mEthods
Participants
Sixty-one 4-year-olds (30 girls, M = 55.34 months, SD = 3.09, 
Range = 49–60 months) were recruited from flyers posted in local 
preschools and list of hospital births. Twenty additional children 
were tested, but excluded from the study due to experimental or 
machine error (n = 10), because they failed the control questions 
(n = 5), due to parental interference (n = 2), refusal to participate 
(n = 1), because they were colorblind (n = 1) or had a learning dis-
ability (n = 1). Fifty-seven children were Caucasian, two children 
were Hispanic, one child was Asian, and one child was of mixed 
Figure 1 | The lightbox used in the procedure. The four buttons, colored 
red, yellow, green, and blue, activated their corresponding light for as long as 
the button was depressed.www.frontiersin.org  November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 176  |  3
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The  final  group  of  children  (n  =  21)  was  assigned  to  the 
  observation condition. These children were given the same dem-
onstration by the experimenter (i.e., one button press on each light, 
with the experimenter narrating the results), but were never allowed 
to act on the lightbox themselves. We ran this condition to ensure 
that any difference between the discovery and confirmation condi-
tions was because of the benefit of discovery, as opposed to children 
in the confirmation condition learning from the observation, but 
becoming distracted by the free play or being less motivated to act 
because they thought they learned from just the demonstration. 
If either of these were the case, we would expect accuracy in this 
condition to be superior to that of the confirmation condition. In 
contrast, if discovery benefits learning, then accuracy in this condi-
tion should be similar to accuracy in the confirmation condition, 
and less accurate than the discovery condition. Critically, in this 
condition, we used the same language to describe what the experi-
menter was doing (so that the child would learn the puzzle).
After the free play or demonstration, children in all three groups 
were then asked a set of causal structure questions to assess how 
accurately children had learned the relations among the lights. We 
asked eight questions for each model: concerning the two direct 
causal relations, those two causal relations in reverse, two questions 
involving the fourth light, which was not involved in the model, and 
two questions looking at the indirect causal links between lights in the 
model. Table 1 shows the exact causal structure questions that were 
asked. These questions were asked in a random order, different for 
each child. If children answered every question across both models 
with “yes” or “no,” they were excluded from the analysis. This ensured 
that children were not simply parroting back an answer, so that results 
were more likely representative of the child’s representation of the 
causal structure. Five children were replaced for this reason.
rEsults
Children required corrective feedback on 8.5% of the causal struc-
ture questions during the familiarization. Children who needed 
corrective feedback on at least one question (n = 23) did not score 
differently on the causal structure questions on either model dur-
box. In the puzzle, some lights make other lights go. Let me show 
you. Let’s press the red button.” The experimenter did so, and red 
and green activated. The experimenter narrated the results and then 
pressed the green button, which resulted in only green activating. 
This was also described to the child. Children were told that these 
data indicated that, “In this puzzle, red makes green go, but green 
does not make red go.” The experimenter then repeated this proce-
dure for the yellow and blue lights (with yellow making blue go).
The experimenter then asked the child six causal structure ques-
tions. Specifically, children were asked whether red caused green 
and green caused red, whether yellow caused blue and blue caused 
yellow, and then two other questions about light pairs (determined 
randomly). If children answered any of these questions incorrectly, 
corrective feedback was given.
Test phase. Children were told that they would try to learn new 
puzzles. All children were asked to learn a common cause model 
(Figure 2A) and a chain model (Figure 2B) involving three lights 
(the fourth light neither caused nor was caused by any other light). 
The order in which children learned the two models was counter-
balanced. Two particular configurations of colors for each model 
were used (counterbalanced across children).
One group of children (n = 20) was randomly assigned to the 
discovery condition. These children were told that it was their turn 
to play with the box “in order to learn the puzzle.” They were given 
the box, and allowed to press buttons to activate the lights. Children 
could intervene on the box for as long as they liked, but they had 
to press each button at least once, and press all the buttons at least 
15 times total (note – they did not have to press each button 15 
times; rather, the total number of button-presses had to exceed 15). 
When children indicated they were finished (and they had made 
more than 15 button-presses – if not they were encouraged to keep 
playing), the experimenter brought the lightbox over to his side 
of the table and pressed each button exactly one time. During this 
demonstration, he narrated the efficacy of that button press (e.g., 
“When I press the red button, the red light comes on…”).
A second group of children (n = 20) was randomly assigned to 
the confirmation condition. These children were given the same 
procedure as those in the discovery condition, but in reverse order. 
They first observed the experimenter press each button on the 
lightbox once (narrating the results), and then could intervene 
on the box “in order to learn the puzzle” until they indicated they 
were finished (determined in the same manner as children in the 
discovery condition).
A  B 
C  D 
A  B 
C  D 
AB
Figure 2 | representations of the causal structures children were asked 
to learn across the experiments. (A) Shows the common cause model and 
(B) shows the chain model. In the experiment, all four lights were present, so 
there was also a fourth light (D) that did not have any causal influence.
Table 1 | exact test questions asked in experiment.
Common cause (A → B, A → C)
Causal structure:  Does A make B go?  Does A make C go?
Causal structure reverse:  Does B make A go?  Does C make A go?
Random:  Does D make B go?  Does C make D go?
Indirect structure:  Does B make C go?  Does C make B go?
Chain (A → B, B → C)
Causal structure:  Does A make B go?  Does B make C go?
Causal structure reverse:  Does B make A go?  Does C make B go?
Random:  Does D make B go?  Does C make D go?
Indirect structure:  Does A make C go? 
Indirect structure reverse  Does C make A go? 
In the procedure for the chain model in this experiment, the indirect structure 
question is ambiguous (the data are consistent with both responses). It was not 
included in the analysis (see Results for details).Frontiers in Psychology  |  Developmental Psychology    November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 176  |  4
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differences were found between children in the confirmation and 
observation conditions. Simple effect analysis also considered the 
difference between the models across each condition individually. 
Only children in the observation condition were more likely to 
learn the common cause model more accurately than the chain 
model, t(20) = 2.27, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.39.
We also analyzed performance compared with chance respond-
ing. On both the common cause and chain models, accuracy was 
greater than chance (50%) in both the discovery, t(19) = 8.11 and 
6.09, both p-values < 0.01, and confirmation conditions, t(19) = 4.99 
and 3.81, both p-values < 0.01, conditions. Children in the observa-
tion condition performed significantly better than chance on the 
common cause model, t(20) = 3.02, p < 0.05, and marginally better 
than chance on the chain model, t(20) = 2.02, p = 0.057.
These data suggest that discovering the efficacy of actions 
influences  causal  learning  beyond  confirming  the  results  of 
another’s actions, but do the actions children generate between 
these conditions differ? Further, do those action patterns relate 
to children’s accuracy across the learning conditions? To address 
these questions, we analyzed whether children’s free play (i.e., 
their pattern of actions on the lightbox) in the discovery and 
confirmation  conditions  differed,  and  whether  meaningful 
patterns of behavior predicted accuracy. Because free play was 
unconstrained, children often pressed multiple buttons at the 
same time, or pressed one button while holding another down, 
resulting in confounded data. Two research assistants, unaware of 
the experimental hypotheses, transcribed videotapes of interven-
tion sequences. One research assistant coded the entire data set; 
the other coded five children selected randomly from each of the 
two conditions (25% of the data). Agreement was determined 
in two manners: whether they agreed on the total number of 
button presses, and whether they agreed on the total number 
of individual button presses (unconfounded interventions). In 
both cases, agreement was 90%. The first author resolved all 
disagreements without knowing whether each child was in the 
discovery or confirmation condition.
A summary of children’s interventions is shown in Table 3. First, 
we examined the total number of interventions made by the child 
(i.e., the number of individual button presses plus the number of 
cases in which the child pressed at least two buttons at the same 
time). Although  children  generated  more  interventions  in  the 
discovery condition for both models, the differences between the 
ing the test phase than children who needed no corrective feed-
back (n = 38), both t(59)-values < 0.11, both ns. This suggests that 
children recognized the basic structure of the task. The proportion 
of correct responses to the causal structure test questions for each 
model and condition is shown in Table 2. Preliminary analyses 
revealed that order, light configuration, and gender had no effect on 
the total proportion of causal structure questions children answered 
correctly, all Mann–Whitney tests, all z-values < 1, all ns.
A 2 (Model) × 3 (Condition) mixed Analysis of Variance was 
performed1. Model was a within-subject factor and condition was 
a between-subject factors. This analysis revealed a main effect 
of model: overall, children were better at learning the common 
cause model than the chain model, F(1, 58) = 6.01, p < 0.05, 
Partial η2 = 0.094. A main effect of condition was also found, F(2, 
58) = 5.20, p < 0.05, Partial η2 = 0.152. No significant interac-
tions were found. Post hoc analyses revealed that children in the 
discovery condition outperformed children in the confirmation 
condition (Tukey HSD test, p = 0.05) as well as children in the 
observation condition (Tukey HSD test, p < 0.05)2. No significant 
Table 2 | Proportion of causal structure questions answered correctly on 
common cause and chain model across the learning conditions.
  Common cause  Chain
Discovery (intervention-first)  85.00 (19.28)  78.57 (20.99)
Confirmation (observation  71.25 (19.07)  66.43 (19.26) 
then intervention)
Observation (no intervention)  69.05 (28.95)  59.86 (22.42)
Standard deviations shown in parentheses. Responses to the ambiguous causal 
structure question in the chain model are not included in this table. All analyses 
reported in the text are on arcsin transformations of these data.
Table 3 | Summary of children’s interventions in the discovery and confirmation conditions.
  Common cause  Chain
  Disc  Conf  Disc  Conf
Total interventions  43.35 (43.42)  26.30 (9.41)  37 .00 (26.60)  28.95 (15.73)
Unconfounded interventions  32.90 (40.56)  16.55 (11.21)  31.95 (23.96)  17 .20 (15.57)
Number of runs on all buttons  2.35 (2.98)  0.65 (1.46)  3.25 (2.47)  0.60 (0.82)
Number of repeat button presses  5.25 (6.28)  1.60 (3.95)  7 .75 (11.10)  1.00 (1.26)
% of repeated unconfounded interventions  21.92 (26.85)  12.35a (24.08)  23.86 (27 .16)  7 .61 (12.52)
Standard deviations shown in parentheses.
Disc, discovery condition; conf, confirmation condition.
aThis percentage is based on n = 19, as one child in the O First condition on this model only generated confounded interventions.
1Because the lightbox worked in a deterministic manner, the indirect causal que-
stion (Does A → C) on the chain model was ambiguous (the data were equally con-
sistent with it being true or false). Thus, it was not included in the analyses. As such, 
scores on the common cause model were a proportion out of eight questions, and 
scores on the chain model were a proportion out of seven questions. The analyses 
presented here were performed on an arcsin transformation of these proportions. 
The same is true for the correlations reported in the next section.
2If we were to treat the comparisons with the observation condition as a control 
comparison and use a Dunnett correction instead of the Tukey, we obtain the same 
significance levels.www.frontiersin.org  November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 176  |  5
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dIscussIon
Four-year-olds whose actions discovered the efficacy of events in a 
causal system were more accurate at learning causal relations than 
children whose actions confirmed the efficacy of another’s actions, 
or children who just observed another person act on the machine. 
Even though children in the discovery and confirmation conditions 
were allowed to engage in free play with the lightbox for as long as 
they wanted, their ability to demonstrate what they had learned 
from those interventions differed.
The effect of discovery on causal learning does not appear to be 
an artifact in our comparison between the discovery and confirma-
tion condition. For instance, it could be that children were more 
interested, and thus more engaged by, the task in the discovery 
condition than the confirmation condition. We cannot explicitly 
rule out this possibility, but aspects of the procedure and results 
speak against this conclusion. First, it is not clear that a single 
demonstration of each button would result in less engagement 
overall, particularly because (at least for the causal chain), the exact 
causal structure was not specified by just observing these data. 
Second, because children in the discovery condition were required 
to observe the experimenter activate each button after their free play 
period, they could also have become unengaged by this observa-
tion. Finally, if engagement is driving our results, then one would 
expect children to be more accurate when they can play with the 
lightbox than when they just watched. However, there was no dif-
ference in performance between the confirmation and observation 
conditions. This null result (in light of the positive result between 
the discovery and confirmation conditions) is hard to explain if 
engagement with the task is solely driving the difference between 
the discovery and confirmation conditions.
A similar concern with concluding that discovery aids children’s 
causal learning is that children in the confirmation condition might 
have believed that they learned the causal structure after the experi-
menter’s demonstration, and then forget those causal relations dur-
ing the free play period. Children might have also become distracted 
by the free play task in the confirmation condition, and forgotten 
the demonstration they observed. Neither of these concerns appears 
to be warranted; if they were, then children would not have shown 
any difference between the discovery and observation conditions. 
Moreover, few aspects of the nature of children’s own action affected 
their ability to learn the models, and no aspect of the data that we 
analyzed affected learning across both of the models.
A point we have not emphasized is that learning across all the 
conditions, and especially the two in which children were allowed 
to generate their own interventions, was quite accurate. We draw 
two conclusions from these results. First, children appeared to 
understand the novel causal system we presented. This might be 
unsurprising, given that there are many investigations in which 
children reason about various novel causal systems (e.g., Siegler, 
1975; Bullock et al., 1982; Shultz, 1982; Sophian and Huber, 1984; 
Gopnik and Sobel, 2000; Schulz et al., 2007). But it is rare that the 
causal system about which children must reason has conflict with 
their authentic causal knowledge; there are few instances of lights 
causing other lights to activate. Some have suggested that chil-
dren’s inferences are different in this circumstance (e.g., Berzonsky, 
1971; Cohen and Oakes, 1993). However, in our procedure, children 
received much direct instruction about the causal system, in which 
conditions was not significant for either model, Mann–Whitney 
U = 183.50 and 189.00 for the common cause and chain models 
respectively, z = −0.45 and −0.30, both p-values ns. Across both 
conditions, there was no relation between the total number of 
interventions the child generated when learning that model and 
their accuracy on the test questions, r(40) = −0.05 and 0.18 for the 
common cause and chain models respectively, both p-values ns.
We next examined whether the number of unconfounded inter-
ventions (i.e., individual, single button presses) differed between 
the conditions and affected causal learning. On both models, chil-
dren made more unconfounded interventions in the discovery 
  condition, Mann–Whitney U = 125.00 and 110.50 for the com-
mon cause and chain models respectively, z = −2.03 and −2.43, 
both p-values < 0.05. However, accuracy on the test questions did 
not relate to the total number of unconfounded interventions the 
children generated, r(40) = −0.06 and 0.14 for the common cause 
and chain models respectively, both p-values ns. Further, the pro-
portion of unconfounded interventions to confounded interven-
tions each child generated also did not predict learning accuracy, 
r(40) = −0.06 and 0.09, both p-values ns.
We next considered whether children chose to generate data in 
a structured manner. Our first measure of structure was whether 
children simply pressed the same button repeatedly, as opposed to 
making an intervention on one button and then a different one. 
We examined the number of times children repeatedly pressed 
any of the four buttons (a “run” of button presses). As an example, 
pressing the red button six times in a row, then the yellow but-
ton, and then the green button five times would be scored as two 
runs (one on red, another on green). Children in the discovery 
condition generated more runs than those in the confirmation 
condition, Mann–Whitney U = 117.00 and 73.00 for the common 
cause and chain models respectively, z = −2.32 and −3.52, both 
p-values < 0.05. The number of runs the child generated was cor-
related with accurate responses on the chain model, r(40) = 0.40, 
p < 0.05, but not the common cause model, r(40) = −0.04, ns. 
The correlation between runs and accuracy on the chain model 
was  marginally  significant  when  condition  was  factored  out, 
r(37) = 0.279, p = 0.085.
Second, we considered the actual number of times children 
pressed buttons repeatedly. In the example above, the two runs 
would equate to nine repeat button presses (i.e., A press of the red 
button was repeated five times, and the green button was pressed 
repeatedly four times). Because these data are confounded with 
the total number of unconfounded interventions children gener-
ated, we analyzed the proportion of those interventions that were 
repeated. Children in the discovery condition had a greater pro-
portion of repeated unconfounded interventions when learning 
the chain model, Mann–Whitney U = 100.00, z = −2.74, p < 0.01. 
No difference was found on the common cause model. Across the 
conditions, the proportion of repeated unconfounded interven-
tions generated by the child was correlated with accurate responses 
on the chain model, r(40) = 0.37, p < 0.05, but not the common 
cause model, r(40) = −0.10, ns. As in the above analysis, the cor-
relation between of the proportion of unconfounded interventions 
that were repeated and learning accuracy on the chain model was 
marginally significant when intervention condition was factored 
out, r(37) = 0.29, p = 0.075.Frontiers in Psychology  |  Developmental Psychology    November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 176  |  6
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both buttons caused lights to activate as well as other lights. Perhaps 
this familiar knowledge helped to bootstrap children’s understand-
ing. Moreover, Buchanan and Sobel (2010) have suggested that 
preschoolers’ causal inferences are similar when the novel environ-
ment in which they must reason is consistent, neutral, or in conflict 
with their authentic causal knowledge (as least about electronics, 
the media used here).
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gests that discovering causal structure helps causal learning, but 
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the environment. We would suggest that in addition to   conditional 
probability, temporal cues, and decision demands, a small but sig-
nificant advantage to the process of causal learning comes from 
discovering causal structure. Bruner (1961) suggested several rea-
sons for this benefit. One possibility is that children treat their 
discoveries as more intrinsically rewarding, and as a result are 
more motivated to learn when they act first as opposed to when 
they have been shown the efficacy of all the buttons. A second 
possibility is that children might be more likely to remember the 
results of their own discoveries; observing the experimenter press 
buttons at the end of the discovery condition might consolidate 
children’s observations into a more easily accessible memory, which 
is accessed when the child is asked the causal structure questions. 
Prior work indicates that both children and adults show greater 
memory for self-generated versus experimenter-performed actions 
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